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Devastating as the two world wars were, theemergence of the United Nations (the UN) witha Charter (the Charter) could be seen as a ray of
hope for international peace and security. The linchpin of
the Charter is the prohibition of war, aggression (or armed
attack) and the recognition of self defence within regulated
parameters. Negotiation, mediation and conciliation
became the watch words, while armed conflicts were to be
nipped in the bud through the instrumentality of
international norms and co-operation of states.
However, in the past decade the new international legal
order started to wake up to the fact that conflict had not
been particularly reduced by the wish to generate more
effectiveness out of the old system, and it was to be realised
too soon that the system was impotent to resolve violent
conflict. The effect was that many policy makers started
dissipating energy on conflict prevention rather than
conflict resolution processes.
Whilst terrorism became a major public issue in the
1980s, and reached the level of actual frenzy in the mid
1980s, the “evil scourge” had always been state-directed
and was tamed by the efforts of states, particularly the
United States (US). Individual or group terrorists engaged
themselves in non-state violence and were not subject to
international law. In any case, the impact of non-state
violence on the peace and security of the international
communities was minimal.
Then came the terrorist attacks of the US in September
11, 2001 and the emergence of the final shift from conflict
prevention, management and resolution to the pre-
emption and deterrence of conflict before it evolves. The
victim state was in the fore front of the new “defence
crusade” or war against terrorism. President Bush declared
that it would seek to prevent the activities of rogue states
and their terrorist clients before they were in a position to
threaten or to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The National Security strategy of the US (NSS) stated that
in order “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts [we will]
if necessary, act pre-emptively”.
However, as subsequent events showed, the US
Declaration left many questions unanswered. First, how
would the international community ensure that states are
prevented from acting liberally behind the façade of
excuses and justification on the ground of pre-emptive self
defence? When and on what terms will it be acceptable for
one state to attack terrorists residing in another sovereign
state? Who will be responsible for drawing the lines of
legality, and deciding when a terrorist threat is grave and
imminent enough to justify pre-emptive actions? How
could it be ensured that pre-emptive self defence is not a
disguised form of reprisal (an action outlawed by the UN
Charter) or coloured by pure state interest – political,
economic or ideological? The Charter’s effectiveness,
along with international peace and security, are threatened
by the dangers posed by these missing links.
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“International peace and security have seldom felt so far away. Decision makers, like
the persons in the streets, feel equally at risk from random acts of violence…Political
leaders are nervous; and nervous riders make for nervous horses. If we are not all
living on the edge, the perception, at least is that we are.” (Virginia Gamba:
“Challenges to International Peace and security: An alternative view”, International
Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security March 8–11, 2005, Madrid)
This paper attempts a re-statement of the concept of
pre-emptive self defence against terrorist attack as a
supposed norm of international law. It also demonstrates
that the solution to terrorism lies not mainly in counter
attacks, as recent events have shown, but in understanding
and addressing the dynamics of the changing world order.
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Definition of terrorism
The international community has never succeeded in
developing an accepted comprehensive definition of
terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s United Nations
attempts to define the term foundered, mainly due to
differences of opinion between various members about the
use of violence in the context of conflicts over national
liberation and self determination. Whilst the problem of
defining terrorism remains, it would appear that the
definition by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is
broadly consistent with most definitions in academic
literature. The ADF defines terrorism as:
“The use or threatened use of violence for political ends or any
use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of putting the
public or any section of the public in fear”.
Two elements are discernible from the above definition
namely: (1) actual or threatened violence against civilians
or persons not actively taking part in hostilities and (2) the
implicit or explicit purpose of the act is to intimidate or
compel a population, government or organization into
some course of action. These elements are exhibited, as we
shall see, in various forms of terrorist attacks.
Outlawing terrorism
Terrorism in all its forms is considered a criminal act
under international law, but historically terrorists have
generally been punished under the domestic law of the
country harmed by the specific act in question. It is
arguable that the mass murders committed on September
11, 2001 in the US by the hijackers probably constituted a
crime against humanity under Article 7 (a) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
first major step in the modern era in outlawing terrorism
under international law was made through the Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism,
developed by the League of Nations in the 1930s.
However, the Convention never came into force. A number
of Conventions were developed during the 1960s and
1970s to address specific types of violent acts such as
aircraft hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, and the taking
of hostages. These generally obligated parties to the
Convention to either prosecute offenders or extradite
them to countries in which the act in question took place.
In spite of its failure to define terrorism, in 1985 the
United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution:
“unequivocally condemn[ing], as criminal, all acts, methods
and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever
committed and calling upon all States to fulfill their
obligations under international law to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist
acts in other States, or acquiescing in activities within their
territory directed towards the commission of such acts”.
Many subsequent General Assembly and Security
Council Resolutions over the last 18 years contain similar
words of prohibition. Many of these Resolutions also state
that terrorism is contrary to the purposes and the
principles of the United Nations and represent a threat to
international peace and security.
Concerted efforts by the UN to develop a more
comprehensive approach to combating terrorism resulted
in the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings (the Bombing Convention) and the
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (the Financing Convention). Under
the Bombing Convention, which came into force in May
2001, a person or group commits an offence if it
unlawfully and intentionally uses an explosive or lethal
device against a public place, a government facility,
infrastructure, or transport craft or system, either with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or extensive
destruction of such a place, facility or system resulting in
major economic loss. However, acts that occur within the
boundaries of a country and do not involve foreign nations
do not come within the Convention, nor do acts by armed
forces involved in armed conflict.
The Bombing Convention aims to deny safe havens to
persons wanted for terrorist bombings (including
accomplices) by obligating each state party to prosecute
such persons if it does not extradite them to another state
that has issued an extradition request. A country cannot
decline to extradite a person on the basis that a bombing
within the meaning of the Convention was a “political
offence”. Importantly, parties to the bombing Convention
are also obliged to take all practical measures to prevent
preparation of terrorist acts where they take place within
their territories.
The Financing Convention provides that an offence
occurs where a person unlawfully provides or collects funds
with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, to carry out various
acts. These acts include an offence under the other various
“Terrorist Conventions” or any other act intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an
act is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act. Accomplices, defined in a
similar way as in the Bombing Convention, are also
deemed as committing an offence. 15
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Again, acts that occur within the boundaries of a country
and do not involve foreign nationals do not come within
the Convention, nor the acts by armed forces involved in
armed conflict. The Convention obligates state parties
either to prosecute or to extradite persons accused of
funding terrorist activities, and requires banks to enact
measures to identify suspect transactions. It also forbids
the use by a country of its bank secrecy laws as an excuse
for not providing assistance to other parties in their
investigations of possible offences.
LEGAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF
FORCE
After the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth
century, many states including the US were fully
committed in 1945 to establishing a broad, legal
prohibition on the use of force, as well as an institution to
enforce that prohibition. The United Nations Charter, a
binding treaty to which all but a few states of the world
adhere, contains the prohibition on force in Article 2(4),
and establishes the Security Council as the authority to take
measures against “threat to peace, breaches of the peace
and acts of aggression”
The general prohibition on the use or threat of force
The prohibition of force in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter is the most basic and important principle of the
Charter. It provides that:
“All members of shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
A striking feature of this provision is the proscription of
all levels of force or threat of force short of war; a major
improvement compared with earlier treaties. It also deals
with armed force directly, (such as the open incursion of
regular military forces into the territory of another state or
cross border shooting into that territory) or indirectly,
(such as the participation of one state in the use of force by
another state or a state’s participation in the use of force by
unofficial bands organized in a military manner) and not
other kinds of force. Support for this view can be found in
the GA Friendly Relations Declaration in the eighth and
ninth paragraphs of its section dealing with the prohibition
of force.
Whilst an isolated reading of the provision may suggest
that force not directed against “the territorial integrity or
political independence” of any state is permitted under the
Charter, the preparatory works do not support this reading
of the prohibition. Rather, both values should be read
together to mean “territorial inviolability” in line with the
historical antecedent of the Charter and general principle
behind the prohibition of force as contained in the
provision of Article 2(3) which is that “[a]ll members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice are not endangered”. According to the rules of
treaty interpretation, a treaty should be read as a whole,
and Article 2(3) is the positive expression of the obligation
in Article 2(4).
The primary purpose of the UN being the maintenance
of peace and security, and the taking of collective measures
to that end, any form of unilateral use of force inconsistent
with this purpose is prohibited. This is reinforced by the
Preamble to the Charter which states that force shall not be
used, “save in the common interest.”
One important effect of Article 2(4) is that armed
reprisals are illegal under the UN Charter, as has been
clarified by the Security Council in many cases including
the British air attack on territory of the Yemen Arab
Republic in 1964; Israel’s acts of military reprisals against
its neighbouring states; and as confirmed by the GA
Friendly Relations Declaration 1970. However, Article
2(4) of the Charter does not prevent a country from
defending itself in response to acts of aggression. The two
exceptions to the rule are contained in Article 51, which
creates the right of self defence in appropriate cases, and
Article 42 which authorises the use of force by states
individually or collectively if specifically authorised by the
Security Council.
The concept of self defence under Article 51
Article 51 of the Charter provides that:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security”.
The above Article accommodates the use of force in self
defence against an armed attack mainly. This reading is
consistent with the plain words of Article 51, with the
drafting history, and official government positions. It is
also consistent with authoritative interpretation of Article
51 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). There are
still questions concerning when an armed attack “begins”
for purposes of the right of self defence, but the Security
Council and governments have clarified some issues since
the US attack of September 11, 2001. An attack must be
under way or must have already occurred in order to
trigger the right of unilateral self defence. Any earlier
response requires the approval of the Security Council.
There is no self appointed right to attack another state
because of fear that the state is making plans or developing
weapons usable in a hypothetical campaign.16
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The requirement of actual armed attack:
The express terms of Article 51 refer to the right of self
defence if an armed attack occurs. The text has been
interpreted by the ICJ on several occasions. The court held
in the case of Nicaragua v US that the right of individual or
collective self defence is triggered only by acts grave enough
to amount to an armed attack. The court relied in part on
the UN General Assembly’s definition of aggression to
conclude that an “armed attack” triggering unilateral self
defence may include “sending by or on behalf of a state of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another state of such
gravity as to amount to…an armed attack conducted by
regular forces…”
The court was assessing the US claim that its use of force
against Nicaragua was a lawful act of collective self defence
of El Salvador. The US argued that Nicaragua had used
unlawful force in the first instance by providing weapons
and supplies to El Salvador rebels, and further that even if
it had done so, the supply of weapons was not the same as
an armed attack. Moreover, El Salvador has not reported to
the Security Council, nor had it invited the US to assist in
its self defence. With Nicaragua in mind, we may conclude
that where a state is threatened by force not amounting to
an armed attack, it must resort to measures less than
armed defence, or it must seek Security Council
authorisation to do more.
Further, states are limited by the principles of state
responsibility, and prohibition on armed reprisals. An
armed reprisal is the use of force for revenge, punishment
or general deterrence. The UN General Assembly has
resolved that armed reprisals are unlawful and that states
have a duty to refrain from using them. The right of self
defence is limited to the right to use force to repel an
attack in progress, to prevent future enemy attacks
following an initial attack, or to reverse the consequences
of an enemy attack, such as ending an occupation. The
state acting in self defence may seek the destruction of an
attacking enemy force if that is necessary and proportional.
The defensive use of force may be delayed after an unlawful
armed attack, depending on the circumstances. Taking a
reasonable amount of time to organise the defence is
permissible.
Force can be used in self defence only against a state
legally responsible for the armed attack. It is generally not
enough that the enemy attack originated from the territory
of a state. Rather, legal responsibility follows if a state used
its own agents to carry out the attack; if it controlled or
supported the attackers; or where it subsequently adopted
the acts of the attacker as its own.
Any use of force in self defence must respect the
principle of necessity and proportionality. Necessity
restricts the use of military force to the attainment of
legitimate military objectives. Proportionality requires that
possible civilian casualties must be weighed in the balance.
If the loss of innocent life or destruction of civilian
property is out of proportion to the importance of the
objective, the attack must be abandoned. Although Article
51 does not expressly state any limitations of the right of
self defence, they were part of the customary international
law taking root from the Webster Declaration in the
Caroline case, and are implicitly an important part of the
provision
Self defence against terrorism
In principle at least, it has always been possible to
accommodate the use of force in response to terrorism
within the traditional inter-state self defence paradigm
outlined above. For this to occur, three conditions need to
be satisfied. First, a state must suffer a terrorist attack
which meets the gravity threshold of an “armed attack”.
Second, those terrorist attacks must be attributable to
another state. Third, the use of force in self defence must
be necessary and proportionate.
In practice, however, the nature of terrorist acts and
non-state terrorist organisations means that it is often
difficult to satisfy these conditions. There are two major
difficulties. The first concerns the gravity threshold for an
“armed attack”, while the second related to the attribution
requirement.
Prior to the September 11 incident in the US, few
individual terrorist attacks were serious enough to meet
the ICJ’s high threshold for an “armed attack” in the
Nicaragua case. The majority of international terrorist acts
consisted of relatively minor attacks on nationals abroad,
rather than large scale attacks on the actual territory of the
victim state. It was therefore difficult to equate terrorist
acts committed by non-state actors with conventional
attacks by a state. As such, it was rare for an individual act
of terrorism to qualify as an “armed attack” triggering a
victim’s state right of self defence.
In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, the US and
Israel have adopted the “cumulative effect” argument.
Under this approach, rather than measuring the gravity of
each individual terrorist attack according to the threshold
for an “armed attack”, consideration is given to the
cumulative effect of a series of attacks. Hence, the
argument is that an ongoing campaign of terrorist acts,
viewed collectively, can amount to an “armed attack”. This
approach, which appears to have been accepted by the ICJ
in the Nicaragua case, has played a major role in attempts
by the US and Israel to establish that terrorist acts should
be treated as “armed attacks”.
The second major difficulty with non-state terrorism is
satisfying the attribution requirement. As pointed out
earlier, to qualify as an “armed attack”, terrorist acts by
non-state groups must be attributable to a state. However,
in the case of non-state terrorist groups, it is often difficult
to fulfil the “effective control” test or other applicable
bases for attribution. Such groups may receive varying 17
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levels of support from a host state. This support can range
from the state having complete operational control over
the non-state actor, to the provision of weapons and
funding, to mere acquiescence or toleration of the group’s
presence on the state’s territory. Only in the first scenario
is the connection between the two entities sufficiently close
to satisfy the “effective control” test. In circumstances
where support falls below this level, a state is not
considered responsible for the acts of a non-state terrorist
group. The assertion of the US and Israel that any form of
assistance, or even mere acquiescence or toleration of a
terrorist group, should make a host state responsible for
the conduct of that group, remained highly controversial
before the US September 11 terrorist attacks.
In any case, state practice involving the use of force
against non-state actors is not unknown. The famous
Caroline incident of 1837, which led to the formulation of
the necessity and proportionality criteria governing self
defence, is one such example. More recently, from the
1960s onwards, Israel and apartheid South Africa used
military force on numerous occasions to respond to cross-
border attacks by non-state groups based in neighbouring
states. These responses were generally condemned by the
Security Council and the international community. In
addition, since 1991 Turkey and Iran have made a number
of incursions into Iraq to target Kurdish military groups
operating there.
In the context of self defence against terrorism, there
were four major events prior to September 11. The first
occurred in October 1985, when Israel bombed the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) headquarters in
Tunisia in response to series of terrorist attacks on Israeli
citizens. Israel’s argument that Tunisia’s toleration of the
PLO’s presence on Tunisian territory had made it
necessary for Israel to act in self defence to prevent further
attacks was not accepted by the international community.
The Security Council condemned Israel’s response as an
act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against
Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the
UN, international law and norms of conduct.
The second major incident occurred in April 1986,
when the US attacked Libyan government facilities in
Tripoli following a terrorist attack on a Berlin night club
which targeted US service personnel. Despite the US
claims that the Libyan government had been directly
involved in planning the night club attack, the international
community condemned the US response. The US again
used force to respond to terrorism when it fired cruise
missiles at Iraq in 1993, following the discovery of a plot
to assassinate former President George H Bush while in
Kuwait. Although the plot was foiled, the US claimed that
it still amounted to an armed attack triggering the right to
use force in self defence.
The response of the international community to this
incident was mixed. While the UN’s action was supported
by the UK and Russia, there was criticism from China and
the Arab States. On the whole however, the international
community’s reaction indicated a growing acceptance
among states of the need to use military force against
terrorism, although this could not be considered as clear
endorsement of the legality of the US action.
The final significant incident prior to September 11
occurred in 1998 when the US attacked an Al Qaida
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and an alleged
chemical weapons factory in Sudan. This was in response
to the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
which the US blamed on Al Qaida. The US claim that it
had acted in self defence to prevent these attacks from
continuing received support from several states. However,
there were condemnations from Russia, Pakistan and the
Arab states, although neither the Security Council nor the
General Assembly took any formal action. At least part of
the concern over the US action stemmed from the fact that
the territorial integrity of the Sudan and Afghanistan had
been violated not in an attempt to target those states
themselves, but rather to attack non-state terrorists located
there.
The international community’s response to these
incidents indicates that even prior to September 11, there
was some acceptance by states of the need to use military
force against terrorism. However, it is clear that in the
cases discussed above, there were doubts as to whether the
particular factual circumstances satisfied the traditional
requirements of self defence.
POST SEPTEMBER 11 AND EXTENDED
RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE
The September 11 attacks of the US by terrorists and
the immediate response by the international community
marked a turning point in the exercise of the right of self
defence. The Security Council responded by passing
Resolution 1368 affirming a member’s right under Article
51 to respond to terrorist attacks, and Resolution 1373
unanimously forbidding the aiding or funding of terrorist
groups and establishing the Council’s Counter Terrorism
Committee to monitor Member States’ implementation of
its provisions. In addition, NATO determined that the
terrorist attacks amounted to an armed attack and invoked
Article V of the 1949 Washington Treaty for the first time.
This was followed by invocation of the ANZUS Treaty.
When the US-led military action in Afghanistan began on
October 5, 2001, there was almost unanimous
international support for the use of force.
The international acceptance of the use of force against
Afghanistan can be explained largely by factual differences
between the September 11 attacks and previous incidents
involving military responses to terrorism. In several
respects, the Afghanistan war was easier to accommodate
within the traditional self defence paradigm than were18
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previous incidents involving the use of force against
terrorism.
First, the September 11 attacks were clearly serious
enough to meet the gravity threshold for an armed attack,
whereas previous terrorist attacks were less likely to satisfy
this threshold. Second, the fact that the September 11
attacks occurred on the territory of the victim state, rather
than being attacks on overseas targets, made it easier to
classify them as an armed attack against the US. Third, the
US went to significant lengths to provide evidence linking
Al-Qaida to the terrorist attacks; evidence which was
accepted by other states. This prevented the types of
evidential doubts which undermined previous incidents.
However, the requirement that an armed attack must be
attributable to a state appears not to have been satisfied to
the extent of not passing the “effective control” test as laid
down by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. It can be argued that
the response of the international community in the
aftermath of September 11 has given rise to a new
principle of customary international law that permits the
use of force in self defence in response to “armed attacks”
committed by non-state terrorist organizations. The new
post-September 11 threshold for attribution is whittled
down considerably so that any level of support for – or
even willing hosting, tolerating or harbouring – terrorists
will be sufficient to make a state responsible for the
conduct of those non-state actors. This new standard will
cover most situations where a non-state actor operates on
the territory of another state.
One scenario that would not satisfy the new attribution
threshold involves weak or failed states that are unable to
prevent terrorist groups from operating on their territory
due to lack of control or resources. While this anomaly
may rule out self defence as a legal basis for military action
on the territory of that host state, it does not render a
victim state powerless. It may be possible for a victim state
to obtain the host state’s consent to intervene on its
territory in order to target a non-state terrorist group
located there.
Imprecise conditions and uncertainties
The post September 11 right to use force in self defence
against states that host or harbour terrorist organisations
that have already committed serious terrorist attacks raises
three main concerns.
The first relates to the range of targets that may be the
subject of force in self defence. Given that transnational
terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida may have cells in
many different states, the post September 11 right to use
force against states that host or harbour such groups could
potentially allow each of these states to be targeted by
military action. At present, the doctrine of harbouring or
hosting appears to make no distinction between a state that
hosts or harbours one terrorist who poses little ongoing
threat, and another state that hosts an entire terrorist
network which continues to commit acts of violence.
There are also potential problems relating to the
duration of military action taken in self defence. In the
context of international terrorist threats it may be difficult
to determine when action in self defence is complete. Such
uncertainties over the duration of self defence create the
potential for conflict between a victim state’s right to
defend itself against ongoing threats and the Security
Council’s role in maintaining international peace and
security.
Another significant concern about the extended right of
self defence against terrorism relates to evidence provision
and the authority of a state to make unilateral decisions to
respond with force. Unless states are required to present
clear and convincing evidence of the need to use military
force in self defence against a state that harbours or hosts
terrorist groups, there is a danger that this new right of self
defence may be abused. To avoid such a problem, it has
been argued that only “the Security Council should decide
whether, and on what conditions, to authorize the use of
force against specific states on the basis of compelling
evidence showing that those states, instead of stopping the
action of terrorist organizations and detaining its members,
harbour, protect, tolerate or promote such organizations”.
Establishing a Security Council-based mechanism of this
nature is vital to ensuring the legitimacy of further military
responses to terrorism.
PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE IN SELF
DEFENCE
How legitimate?
Given the weight of opinion in support of the expansive
interpretation of self defence doctrine as outlined above, it
is arguably legitimate to grant UN Member States a right to
pre-emptive self defence. Arguments for and against the
existence of such a right have sought support in the
writings of legal philosophers. Hugo Grotius stated the
danger “must be immediate and imminent in point of
time…but those who accept fear of any sort as justifying
anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived and
deceive others”. Emmerich De Vattel, on the other hand,
argued a nation has “the right to prevent an injury where
it sees itself threatened with one.”
The position of this paper however, is that the notion of
pre-emption in relation to the use of force in self defence
is neither supported by international law nor by state
practice. Proponents of pre-emptive self defence generally
base their arguments on the word inherent in Article 51.
The argument is that Article 51, by pledging to “Impair the
inherent right of self defence,” left intact the unchanged
law of customary self defence predating the adoption of the
UN Charter, citing the Caroline case as authority for this
proposition. 19
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It is suggested that inherent right theory has many
weaknesses starting with the interpretation of customary
international law before the adoption of the Charter. At the
time of the Caroline case, the use of force was generally
lawful as an instrument of national policy. The UN Charter
was adopted for the very purpose of creating a far wider
prohibition on force than existed under treaty or custom in
1945, let alone 1842 when the Caroline case was decided.
Even if earlier custom allowed pre-emptive self defence,
arguing that it persisted after 1945 for UN Members
requires privileging the word “inherent” over the plain
terms of Article 2(4) and the words “armed attack” in
Article 51 of the Charter. Permitting pre-emptive self
defence at the sole discretion of a state is fundamentally at
odds with the Charter’s design. It is an exception that
would overthrow the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4) and thus the very purpose of the UN. The ICJ
in the Nicaragua case rejected the right to use force in the
absence of an armed attack.
Some writers promoting the inherent right theory argue
that the parameters of the right of self defence are
unchangeable by Charter text and subsequent state
practice, being jus cogens. But no authority has ever
identified a unilateral right of anticipatory self defence as a
jus cogens principle. The Charter’s expectation was that
states would rely on the decision of the Security Council to
deal with the early concerns about international security.
Indeed, the ICJ has identified the Charter prohibition on
the use of force, Article 2(4), as jus cogens, not self defence.
Some writers question the viability of any rules on
prohibition of the use of force. They cite states’ continuing
breach of Charter rules and conclude that the Charter
regime and its rules are no longer viable, as they have
slipped into desuetude because they are so widely ignored.
The simple response to this view is contained in the often
cited view of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. As the judges
noted in that case:
“The court does not consider that, for a rule to be established
as Customary, the corresponding practice must be in
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to
deduce the existence of customary rules, the court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct
inconsistent with a given rule should generally be treated as
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of
a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible
with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing
to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself,
then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable
on that basis, the significance of the attitude is to conform
rather than to weaken the rule”.
As long as inconsistent state practice is treated as law
violation and as practice moves toward a new customary
rule, the rules remain viable. If the international
community continues to express support for the rules –
another form of state practice – the rules remain.
It has also been argued that recent international events,
such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
US, have resulted in a need to wholly reassess the self
defence doctrine having due regard to the contemporary
capabilities of adversaries and their apparent
determination to achieve their goal. It has further been
claimed that the September 11 attacks have changed “the
strategic responsibilities of democratic states”. With the
steady emergence of weapons of mass destruction, it is
reasonable to suggest that even those steadfast against
allowing pre-emption in international law must reconsider
the effect of the doctrine. Requiring states to wait until
actually attacked before mounting a defence is unrealistic
in modern conflict. To do so makes “sitting ducks” of
states, opening them not only to collateral damage, but also
the potential destruction of any means of defence
subsequent to an aggressor’s assault. It is arguable that the
Bush administration sought to justify its operations in Iraq
on the basis of liberal interpretation of the right to
anticipatory self defence. But what is the legitimacy of such
a claim?
Following the events of September 11, the Bush
administration declared an intention to seek and destroy
international terrorist networks, vowing to rid the world of
terror once and for all. The valiant charge was backed by
the release of the administration’s new strategic doctrine,
claiming the right to use force in pre-emption of potential
threats to the US, including weapons of mass destruction
and terrorism – the first divergence from the US
deterrence and containment rhetoric since the cold war.
Applying the law of self defence, as discussed earlier, to
the facts surrounding US operations in Iraq, it is clear that
no elements of pre-emptive self defence were present, and
justification on this basis is void. As pointed out by
commentators, the necessity of their self defence was not
instant or urgent. Iraq had not indicated an intention to
attack the US or any other country. The US had expressed
an intention to invade Iraq months before actually doing
so. Further, there were alternatives available to the Bush
administration to avert any threat posed by Iraq. Most
commentators would also have difficulty finding the scale
of attack carried out by the coalition forces was
proportional to any perceived threat. The violent US
offensive was one of the most severe seen in modern days.
It caused mass destruction of lives, infrastructure and
ultimately, Saddam’s regime. Where proportionality is to
be assessed with reference to the threat posed, it is
arguable little to no threat was posed by Iraq at the time,
and it would follow that the actions of the US and coalition
forces were anything but proportional.
The principal reason given for the invasion was to
prevent the stockpile and use of weapons of mass
destruction, including biological and chemical weapons.20
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No firm evidence of the existence of such weapons was
presented by the US or the British ally, and there was
certainly no sign Iraq had threatened to use weapons
allegedly held within the territory. As commentators
argued, the subsequent events of the invasion were
illustrative that Saddam Hussein’s regime was not in
possession of weapons of mass destruction; or at least, that
they were not inclined to use them, even in the face of dire
circumstances such as the wholesale death and destruction
caused by the coalition invasion. Further, there was no
evidence of Iraqi’s intention to attack any other state in
over a decade.
A counter argument with reference to the events of the
years preceding the second Gulf war is that, viewed as the
final episode in a conflict initiated more than a dozen years
earlier by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the issue of pre-
emption does not enter into the debate. Alternatively, it is
suggested that the risk embodied in allowing the Iraqi
regime to defy the international community by pursuing
weapons of mass destruction was sufficient to justify pre-
emption and, viewed in the context of past actions of Iraq
and threats posed over a protracted period of time, lawful
under international law and justified on the basis of
Security Council Resolutions between 1990 and 2003. But
a simple reaction to this is that the doctrine of pre-
emption plainly does not encompass the overthrow of
regimes with records of aggressive behaviour. Nor does it
legitimise the use of force against states deemed unfriendly
in order to deny them weapons systems already deployed
by other sovereign states.
Effect on the operation of the United Nations
Charter System
Reliance on pre-emptive self defence in the use of force
under the guise of Article 51 of the UN Charter has
distorted the concept of a universal prohibition on the use
of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter. A commentator
offers several possible explanations of the effect of the
conflict. The first is that the US as the dominant state in
the contemporary world order is exempt from
accountability for the use of force, which is irreconcilable
with the Charter. States who do not enjoy an exemption for
association would, by contrast, be held to account.
Secondly, it is argued, the conflict demonstrates that the
Charter system no longer accords with modern political
realities and is no longer authoritative on the validation of
such actions. Thirdly, it is suggested that the tension
between the conduct of the US and the Charter is one
which respects the underlying values of the international
community and requires an organic approach to legality-
not a question of either/or, but a question to be answered
having regard to all the circumstances of the case. In the
light of the escalation of terrorism, pre-emptive force, in
order to seek out and destroy terror networks should be
considered in terms of an expansion of the self defence
justification. Finally, it is said that the source of
legitimization may be found in the end result of the conflict
which, in the case of the Iraqi attack, is:
“the emancipation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive
regime, reinforced by the overwhelming evidence that Baghdad
rulers were guilty of systemic, widespread, and massive crimes
against humanity, and an occupation that prepares the Iraqi
people for political democracy and economic success.”
The implications in international law of the kindred
justification will be examined later.
One fundamental question is whether the US will seek
Security Council authorization before carrying out future
military operations against rogue states, or if it will
consider itself vindicated by the apparent achievement of
its objective in taking unilateral action supported by allies,
using the Iraq as a model for future conflicts. The US,
incidentally has dangerously assumed a special legal status,
in which it has rights not available to others. At the West
Point Commencement in 2002, President Bush intimated
that the US can make choices unavailable to others and yet,
the US is equal before the law with all other foreign states.
If America creates a precedent through its practice, that
precedent will be available, like a loaded gun, for other
states to use as well. The pre-emptive use of military force
would establish a precedent that the US has worked against
since 1945, and would provide legal justification for
Pakistan to attack India, for Iran to attack Iraq, for Russia
to attack Georgia, for Azerbaijan to attack Amenia, for
North Korea to attack South Korea, etc. Any state that
believes another regime poses a possible future threat –
regardless of the evidence – could cite the US invasion of
Iraq.
Pre-emptive self defence not only undermines the
restraint on when states may use force, it also undermines
the restraints on how states may use force. In a clear case
of actual armed attacks, the victim state measures
proportionality against attacks that have occurred or that
are planned. What measure can be used to assess
proportionality against a possible attack? The state acting
pre-emptively is making a subjective determination about
future events that will need to make a subjective
determination about how much force is needed for pre-
emption. As in the case of Iraq, massive force may be
employed to take over the whole country and eliminate its
government
The dangerous trend set by the principle of pre-emptive
self defence has the implication that states now have an
incentive to by-pass the Security Council and, take
unilateral action in self defence instead. Situations in which
military actions are taken by group of states acting outside
the UN collective security framework may be evidence of a
trend in which multilateral coalitions are increasingly
replacing the UN as the body responsible for maintaining
international peace and security. Given that these coalitions
may be used by stronger states to further their own
interests, this may prove to be an undesirable development. 21
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WAR AGAINST TERRORISM OR A NEW
FORM OF IMPERIALISM?
Barring the catastrophic event of September 11, 2001,
and the consequent befitting response of the international
community, it is said that the US military attacks on
Afghanistan and Iraq were propelled by the geo-political
aims of US imperialism. Reference has been made to a
letter by the US Ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte
where he remarked that: “We may find that our self
defence requires further action with respect to other
organizations and other states”. Events following the
military attacks have shown that the US effort is not
confined to the selection of targets for military attack, but
goes to the determination of what form of rule is to be set
in place by the imperialist powers at the conclusion of the
military intervention. Commentators drew a comparison
between the war against piracy in the nineteenth century as
an important element in the expansion of colonialism and
the war against terrorism which is being pursued for the
same aims. In the words of Paul Johnson:
“America and her allies may find themselves, temporarily at
least, not just occupying with troops but administering
obdurate terrorist states . These may eventually include not
only Afghanistan but Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Syria.
Democratic regimes willing to abide by international law will
be implanted where possible, but a Western presence seems
unavoidable in some cases.”
The best medium-term solution, it is said, is to be found
perhaps in the old League of Nations mandate system
which served well as a respectable form of colonialism
between the wars. Syria and Iraq were once highly
successful mandates. Sudan, Libya and Iran have likewise
been placed under special regimes by international treaty.
According to Johnson:
“Countries that cannot live at peace with their neighbours
and wage covert war against the international community
cannot expect total independence. With all the permanent
members of the Security Council now backing, in varying
degrees, the American led initiative, it should not be difficult
to devise a new form of UN mandate that places terrorist
states under responsible supervision”.
The League of Nations’ initiative of the mandate system
has already started in the 90s with the placing of East
Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo and Bosnia under UN rule.
In what he called “defensive imperialism”, Wolf based
his justification on “failed states”. He maintained that if the
failed states became too dangerous for the established
states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive
imperialism. He maintains that the central problem
confronting the “failed states” is that there is no organized
state apparatus capable of imposing order, the pre-
condition for civilized life, with the result that such states
become trapped in a vicious circle in which poverty begets
lawlessness and lawlessness begets more poverty. He cited
Afghanistan as an example of a tribal grouping desperately
poor with war as a way of life and the ruling regime funding
itself with money from the export of hard drugs, with
Osama bin Laden as the godfather.
The foregoing argument appears specious and
hypocritical. The so-called failed state is a direct product of
the interventions of the imperialist powers – organizing
coups, stocking up civil wars and ethnic conflicts for their
own purposes, arming repressive regimes, and the
imposition of economic policies that have created a social
disaster for the people of these countries. The
impoverishment of the entire sub Saharan Africa – the
region of many such failed states – stems from the fact that
in any year, the repayment of loans and interest to the
major western banks and bodies such as the IMF is greater
than the entire budget for health and education. Also, the
facts are completely ignored concerning the role of the US,
in collaboration with the Saudi regime and Pakistan, in
financing the warring factions to the tune of at least $10
billion, the support provided to the Taliban, and the
promotion of Osama bin Laden when it served the
interests of the imperialist powers.
If a failed state is to be rescued, Wolf writes, the essential
parts of honest government – above all, the apparatus –
must be provided from outside. That is what the west is
doing today in the former Yugoslavia. He says what is
needed is not pious aspirations but an honest and
organized coercive force. There are two reasons why the
idea will cause horror: imperialism remains suspect and
the effect will be costly. Yet these objections can be met
through the creation of some form of UN temporary
protectorate.
TERRORISM AND STATES’ INTERESTS
The politics of international relations lies most
essentially in the interests of subjects of international law.
Whilst the UN Charter and the various organs of the UN
appear to provide a common front towards the realization
of international peace and security, the perspective of states
to issues including the thorny issue of terrorism is coloured
by an individual state’s interest. There are two vital
dimensions to this: (1) states’ interests as the precipitating
factor culminating in, and fuelling of terrorist activities and
(2) counter-measures dictated and guided by states’
interests.
A dispassionate assessment of the regime of terrorism
shows that terrorism arises in situations where there is
despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression,
extensive human rights abuses, foreign occupation and
weak state control, and victims of such terrorist attacks
have been identified as being responsible for the sorry state
of affairs in an endeavour to actualize certain political,
social, economic, or ideological objectives. This is true of
the situation in the Middle East, Kashmir, Iran, Iraq, and
to some extent, Pakistan. Agitations in reaction to22
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frustrations resulted in violence and terrorist tactics as the
lone solution to their problems. Modern communications
enable deprived people to get together and unite quickly,
and human rights organizations around the world increase
their awareness. Handy modern weapons with tremendous
power help them fight the system when they want to.
Counter-terrorist measures however take the form of
military attacks seeking to physically destroy terrorism. But
behind the facade of military solution as demonstrated in
Iraq and Afghanistan is an interest in creating an effective
democratic infrastructure as part of the overall strategy.
The argument is that democracies do not support
terrorism, and that the condoning of ugly dictatorships by
states often results in violation of human rights.
At this point, it could be said that the argument of the
victim of terrorist attack lacks any legal base. The recent
international legal order put in place in 1945 does not
recognize the legality of military intervention even in cases
of genocide or ethnic cleansing, and ipso facto would not
recognize an intervention to defend human rights by
putting a democratic regime in place. There is no provision
in the UN Charter or in any international instrument
which would permit such intervention. Under the UN
Charter, force may only be used in self defence or on
authorization by the UN Security Council. The purpose of
and reasons for the use of force, and the enforcement of
protected human values, were not distinguished. The
Charter did not authorize the use of armed force by any
state against another state for the protection of human
rights or the establishment of democratic institutions, or
for any other cause.
THE PROBLEM OF LEGALITY OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM OPERATIONS
The extension of the notion of self defence undermines
existing legal inhibitions for the use of force in
international relations. The veracity of the claim that any
state victim of a terrorist attack could act militarily against
another by claiming that the perpetrators responsible for
the attack are installed in its territory will prove difficult to
determine, since evidence is normally furnished by secret
services, and is not made public. In principle, any state
victim of a terrorist attack could inculpate another, using
Article 51 as a pretext. Here, the danger of abuse is
evident.
It is apparent that a Security Council intervention would
have been a far more suitable response to a terrorist attack
than a self defence, because the Council could determine
the scope of its action. However, having refrained from
intervening twice, it seems rather unlikely that it will
behave differently in future. This means that irregularities
in the conduct of self defence operations will most
probably become more frequent. This conduct by the
Security Council has contributed towards undermining its
own significance as the body primarily responsible for the
maintenance of international security.
The need for regulation
The problem of the legality of counter-terrorism
operations could be solved by means of a Regulation of the
use of force in response to international terrorist attacks
through the adoption of an international Convention. This
Convention should include at least the following elements:
• an agreed definition of terrorism, with criteria
determining what kinds of actions qualify as terrorist
acts;
• the specific conditions under which forcible action is
permissible; and
• the conditions and limits to which the recourse to force
is subject.
Codifying the use of force against terrorism would allow
the international community to influence the responses to
the attacks to come before they occur. Through such a
Convention, forcible measures against international
terrorists should be incorporated into legality in a
concerted and controlled way. The Convention should
permit states to react to terrorist attacks without
undermining the existing non-interventionist system. This
is however a delicate balance that can only be achieved
through careful design. It should be borne in mind that the
current system of collective security is founded upon the
prohibition of the use of force. Exceptions to this ban need
to be interpreted narrowly. It is therefore necessary to
impose clear limits on these exceptions in order to reduce
their inherent perils of abuse.
Codification is a better alternative than continuing to
broaden the right of self defence. The system we need for
the future will have to accommodate new threats while
essentially preserving the non-interventionist regime.
Since there is still no perfect formula suggesting how this
should be done, it is time for the international community
to start thinking about how to cope with the new
environment. It is unwise to let new rules develop as events
unfold, leaving their formulation to the will of the powers
that happen to be involved.
THE PARADIGM SHIFT
One hard fact stares the whole world in the face after
September 11. It is now clear that in a rapidly globalising
world, the fallout from major lasting acts of injustice
cannot be confined to that area or region, and that the
victims of that injustice or grave wrongdoing are ultimately
bound to go underground and pay back in their own way.
Whilst the US for example, says those who support, shield,
or harbour terrorists should be treated like terrorists, the
victims of prolonged injustice around the world also think
that those who support the countries or groups who inflict 23
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miseries on them should also be treated like perpetrators
of such injustice or inhumanity.
Today, the world is poised to fighting an enemy who
seems to be in places but is not really visible or easily
identifiable. Terrorist actions are peculiarly sporadic and
globalized, with ideological intent revolutionizing a
terrorist crusade for recognition and respect for human
rights and self determination. Whilst the international
community remains divided over the Middle East crises,
those seeking to vent their grievances went underground to
deliver violent responses. Also in Kashmir, the agitation for
the right to self determination fell on deaf ears, resulting in
the use of violence and terrorist tactics as the attempted
solution to the problem.
It is said that the much touted globalisation cannot be
only for trade or movement of money and services. It has
also to bring about a just and fair world where injustice,
intolerance and oppression are not permitted, much less
encouraged in a partisan manner. If the world must fight
terrorism, the root of that pervasive malady has to be
attended to. It is submitted that the root of terrorism lies
in man’s deprivation, discrimination, impoverishment, and
eventual social isolation. The international community
should therefore:
• Recognise and respect human rights across the globe
generally, and, in particular, the majority community
should try to absorb the minorities politically and
concede their religious and social rights. Alienation, or
a sense of deprivation and ultimate outrage, is the seed
of terrorism.
• Act as objective observers and encourage effective
reconciliation of warring parties over political, social,
religious or ideological differences.
• Dialogue through the machinery of the UN and other
regional organisations and collective actions of states
will go a long way in doing justice in conflict situations.
• Ensure the upholding of the tenet of equality of states,
notwithstanding the imbalances in the structure of the
UN organs. The political and economic strength of the
US should be harnessed towards the actualization of
international peace and security, and in fostering social
and economic emancipation of weaker states.
• Sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity
remain inviolable under the UN Charter and hence, in
reacting to terrorist attacks, due consideration shall be
given to the fundamental principles of attribution and
State responsibility.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that terrorists must be hunted down
and brought to justice. It may take military action to do
this, but the action must be proportionate, so that the
culprits are punished without inflicting more deaths on
innocent civilians. It is not a US led war that is required
but a humanitarian-centred response that includes
appropriate military action with a range of comprehensive
measures to uproot terrorism.
Not only must any military strike under the aegis of the
self defence article of the UN be within the confines of
international law, it must also be in part effective
international co-operation to combat terrorism based on
the principles of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
including respect for international humanitarian law and
human rights. At the very least, any military response must
be limited to the least possible damage.
However, at this turning point for the world, we need to
face up to a hard reality: military might alone will not
defend us from against those who lash out at humanity
itself because of their consuming hatred. Such hatred
exploits the brutalities of poverty, oppression, power,
greed, and similar characteristics of modern society. Thus,
our long range defence will lie in addressing the great
injustices that today are worsening the divisions between
rich and poor, the powerful and the vulnerable, the
triumphant and the despairing.
The emphasis on militarism stands in sharp contrast to
the social deficit of humanity. Almost half the world’s
people live in abject poverty. Of the 4.6 billion people in
developing countries, one billion lack access to clean water
and 2.4 billion do not have basic sanitation. The richest 1
per cent of the world’s people receive as much income as
the poorest 57 per cent. Sixty six countries are now poorer
than they were a decade ago. Stamp out today’s terrorists
without stamping out the problem that spawned them and
we will have accomplished little to ensure our safety. For
tomorrow’s terrorists are the children in today’s refugee
camps.
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